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JUSTICE STEVENS, THE WRITER
SONJA R. WEST*
In any discussion about United States Supreme Court Justice John Paul
Stevens, you're likely to hear him labeled in a variety of ways-as a brilliant
"judge's judge,"' the highly successful leader of the Court's more liberal
wing,2 the prolific "maverick," 3 and a shrewd questioner from the bench.'
You might also hear him described simply as a polite and humble
Midwesterner, bow-tie aficionado and diehard Cubs fan. Yet while Justice
Stevens is and was all of these things, there is another important title he
richly deserves yet often does not receive-Justice Stevens, the excellent
writer.
When considering Justice Stevens's writing on the Court, much of the
attention is placed on his process rather than his final product. It is well
known, for example, that he was one of the only justices on the Court who
consistently wrote his own first drafts a practice, he once explained, that
"helps you think through a case, and when you write it out yourself, you
often learn things about the case that you hadn't realized."' He is also often
praised for his in-depth loyalty to the facts' and his resistance to expanding
a case into something it is not. As he once stated: "[I]t is not our job to apply
laws that have not yet been written."7
But it was at this point, after he parsed the facts and homed in on the
legal issues, that Justice Stevens, the Writer, would take over. Having made
up his mind regarding the proper outcome of the case, Justice Stevens would
* Otis Brumby Distinguished Professor of First Amendment Law, the University of Georgia
School of Law. I am grateful to the many former clerks of Justice Stevens who shared their favorite
pieces of his writing. I also owe thanks to our faculty services librarian, T.J. Striepe, for his helpful
research assistance.
1. E.g., BOB WOODWARD & SCOTT ARMSTRONG, THE BRETHREN: INSIDEt TE SUPREME COuRT
401 (1979).
2. E.g., Jess Bravin, Stevens Evolved from Court Loner to Liberal Wing .s Leader, WAtL ST. 3.
(June 30, 2010), https://www.wsj.com/articles/SB 10001424052748703374104575337264290709470.
3. E.g., Christopher L. Eisgruber, How the Maverick Became a Lion: Afirimative Action in the
Jurisprudence ofJohn Paul Stevens, 99 GEO. LJ. 1279 (2011).
4. Jeffrey Toobin. After Stevens. TllE NEW YORKER (Mar. 22, 2010) (quoting former Solicitor
General Paul Clement saying it was always Justice Stevens' questions that put you "on your guard,
because he's probably found the one issue that puts your case on the line").
5. Interviews With United States Supreme Court Justices: Justice John Paul Stevens, 13 SCRimts
J. LEGAL WRITING 41, 42 (2010).
6. Toobin, supra note 4("Most Supreme Court Justices, if they write first drafts of their opinions
at all, concentrate on the legal analysis, which usually includes the flowery language that gets quoted in
newspapers and textbooks; it is for their law clerks to write up the facts of the case, the driest part.
Stevens always does the facts himself (and says he does all the other drafting, too).").
7. Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 456 (1984).
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masterfully employ the many implements of the writer's toolbox
delightful turns of phrases, creative analogies, memorable word choices and
impassioned moments of eloquence to make his points. Luckily, thanks to
his exceptionally long tenure on the Court" and his propensity to author
separate opinions, he left us with a treasure trove of his writings to enjoy.'
In this essay, I strive to celebrate the unsung writing talents of Justice
Stevens. This is by no means meant to be a serious linguistic study of his
writings, nor is it an exhaustive overview. My goal, rather, is simply to
highlight his skills as a wordsmith with some of the most memorable
examples. What follows is a collection of snippets of Justice Stevens's
writing drawn from my own reservoir of personal favorites and an informal
survey of other former Stevens clerks.
lUMOR
When asked to share favorite pieces of Justice Stevens's writing, many
of his admirers first brought up the times when Justice Stevens was funny.
Yes, that's right, funny. Of course, anytime someone brings up the subject
of Supreme Court justices and humor, it generally requires a slight lowering
of the bar for what counts as "funny." This is no doubt because the work of
the Court as a whole is very serious. This sober backdrop is precisely why
it can be so surprising whenever a justice inserts a moments of
lightheartedness. And while the justices do occassionally crackjokes during
oral argument," comedy is far less likely to appear in the Court's written
decisions. Yet Justice Stevens would, on select occasions, employ humor in
his written opinions. And he did so not just to make the reader grin, but
often to emphasize the weakness or irrationality of the other side's
arguments.
For example, in the 2007 case of Morse v. Frederick, the Court addressed
the question of whether a public high school violated the free speech rights
of one of its students when it suspended him for displaying a banner reading
8. Justice Stevens served on the Supreme Court for thirty-four years and six months, making him
the third longest serving justice in the Court's history. John Paul Stevens . O)v7 (last visited Mar. 13,
2017), https:.//www.oyez.org/,justiCes/john-paul-stevens. He was only three days shy of matchitng the
second longest serving justice. Justice Stephen Field, and about two years short of the longest serving
,justice, his predecessor Justice William Douglas.
9. Justice Stevens is, tf course, still writing. Since his retirement he has published two books and
is reported to be working on a third (at the age of ninety-seven). This essay, however, focuses on the
opinions lie authored while serving on the Supreme Court.
10. See Ryan A. MalphuI-s, "People Did Sonteuirnes Siick Things in rny Underwear" The Function
of Laughter at the U.S Siprene Court, 10 COMM. L. R:v. 48 (2010); Jay D. Wexler, Laugh T-ack, 9
GRtEN BAG 2D 59 (2005).
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"Bong Hits 4 Jesus" at a school-sanctioned event." The majority concluded
that there was no constitutional violation, holding that schools can regulate
student speech when the student advocates illegal drug use.
Writing in dissent, Justice Stevens took issue with the Court's ruling,
arguing that the majority was upholding a viewpoint-based regulation. But
he also was not convinced that the student's cryptic message was actually
advocating illegal drug use. He was further skeptical that any of his
classmates would interpret the message that way and, if they did, that it
would actually cause them to do drugs. To make his point, Justice Stevens
used humor and repurposed the Court's most famous line regarding student
speech rights' 2 :
Admittedly, some high school students (including those who use
drugs) are dumb. Most students, however, do not shed their brains at
the schoolhouse gate, and most students know dumb advocacy when
they see it. The notion that the message on this banner would actually
persuade either the average student or even the dumbest one to
change his or her behavior is most implausible.' 3
In another memorable example, Justice Stevens again turned to humor
to expose what he viewed as the absurdity of the opposing position in the
1976 case of Young v. American Mini Theaters, Inc..1 4 This case considered
the constitutionality of city zoning ordinances that differentiated between
movie theaters that showed "adult" films and those that did not. Writing for
the Court, Justice Stevens held that the zoning ordinances did not violate
the First Amendment, because they did not censor such films but simply
placed limitations on where they may be shown. He further noted that while
political speech went to the core of our freedom of speech, "few of us would
march our sons and daughters off to war to preserve the citizen's right to
see 'Specified Sexual Activities' exhibited in the theaters of our choice."'
In other cases, he appeared to be relying on his own personal experience
to frame the joke, such as his dissent in FCC v. Fox Television Stations, Inc.,
when he noted: "As any golfer who has watched his partner shank a short
approach knows, it would be absurd to accept the suggestion that the
resulting four-letter word uttered on the golf course describes sex or
11. 551 U.S. 393, 397 (2007).
12. Sce Tinker v. Des Moines Indep. Oty. Sch. Dist., 393 U.S. 503. 506 (1969) ("It can hardly
be argued that either students or teachers shed their constitutional rights to freedom of speech or
expression at the schoolhouse gate.").
13. Morse, 551 U.S. at 444 (Stevens, J., dissenting).
14. 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976).
I5. Id.
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excrement and is therefore indecent."" Another time he seemed to be
teasing his younger colleagues' driving abilities when it came to viewing a
video of a high-speed police chase. Dissenting from the Court's holding that
the police officer's use of deadly force during the chase was warranted, he
made this observation in a footnote:
I can only conclude that my colleagues were unduly frightened by
two or three images on the tape that looked like bursts of lightning or
explosions, but were in fact merely the headlights of vehicles
zooming by in the opposite lane. Had they learned to drive when most
high-speed driving took place on two-lane roads rather than on
superhighways- when split-second judgments about the risk of
passing a slowpoke in the face of oncoming traffic were routine-
they might well have reacted to the videotape more dispassionately. "
While he often used humor to strengthen his arguments, Justice Stevens
was also not above the occasional well-placed pun for its own sake. In fact,
even forner President Gerald Ford, who nominated Justice Stevens to the
Court in 1975, was an open admirer of the Justice's "charming wit and sense
of humor."" In a letter written in 2005, President Ford noted that he
particularly enjoyed his dissent to the 1986 Commerce Clause Case of
Maine v. Taylor involving a state statute limiting the interstate trade in
minnows, which Justice Stevens began with the line: "There is something
fishy about this case."
CHARACTERIZATIONS AND IMAGERY
While there are certainly times when a chuckle can be a useful writing
tool, Justice Stevens's skill may have been at its most impactful when he
used colorful language to bring into focus the core issue at stake. He did this
through vivid imagery and spot-on characterizations or analogies that
painted an unforgettable picture in his readers' minds.
Take, for example, his concurrence in the 2000 case of Nixon v. Shrink
Mo. Gov't PAC in which he addressed the question of whether campaign
finance regulations can infringe on a free speech right.2" He explained his
10. 556 U.S. 502, 543 (2009) (Stevens, J.. dissenting).
17. Scott v. laris, 55 U.S. 372. 390 n.1 (2007) (StevensJ.,dissenting).
I 8. William Michael Treanor, Introduction: ITe Jurisprudcnce o/.Justice Slevens,. 74 I)IFO AM
I.. REv. 1557, 1559 (2006).
19. Id.
20. 528 J.S. 377 (20001).
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view on why such comparisons to campaign spending and speech are
incorrect by writing:
Money is property; it is not speech. Speech has the power to Inspire
volunteers to perform a multitude of tasks on a campaign trail, on a
battleground, or even on a football field. Money, meanwhile, has the
power to pay hired laborers to perform the same tasks. It does not
follow, however, that the First Amendment provides the same
measure of protection to the use of money to accomplish such goals
as it provides to the use of ideas to achieve the same results.21
Justice Stevens frequently turned to succinct analogies to drive home his
arguments. In Carey v. Population Services International, for example, he
explained his opposition to a state law prohibiting the sale of contraceptives
to minors by noting that banning contraceptives for teenagers to express the
state's disapproval of their sexual conduct was like showing "disapproval
of motorcycles by forbidding the use of safety helmets."22 And in the 1985
case of California v. Carney, he dissented from the Court's holding that a
motor home was subject to the automobile exception of the search warrant
requirement of the Fourth Amendment. The proper analogy of a motor home
was not a car, he contended, but "the functional equivalent of a hotel room,
a vacation and retirement home, or a hunting and fishing cabin."2 ' In the
1978 case of FCC v. Pacifica, he added a twist to an old Justice Sutherland
analogy that a nuisance is "like a pig in the parlor instead of the barnyard" 24
by noting the when the FCC "finds that a pig has entered the parlor, the
exercise of its regulatory power does not depend on proof that the pig is
obscene."2 1
Some of his characterizations were particularly quick and sharp. It's hard
to argue, for example, with his observation in Rita v. United States that "a
district judge who gives harsh sentences to Yankees fans and lenient
sentences to Red Sox fans would not be acting reasonably even if her
procedural rulings were impeccable."26 Similarly, it is difficult to disagree
with his statement that "[a] law conscripting clerics should not be
invalidated because an atheist voted for it."27 He likewise managed to
concisely describe what he thought was wrong with the Court's expansive
21. Id. at 398 (Stevens, J., concurring).
22. 431 U.S. 678, 715 (1977) (Stevens. J., concurring).
23. 471 U.S. 386, 407 (1985) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
24. Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.S. 365, 388 (1926).
25. FCC v. Paci flca Found., 438 U.S. 726, 750-51 (1978).
26. 55 1 U.S. 338, 365 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring).
27. Washington v. Davis. 426 U.S. 229, 253 (1976) (Stevens, J., concurring).
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view of state sovereignty by stating that "the law would be well served by a
prompt rejection of National League of Cities' modern embodiment of the
spirit of the Articles of Confederation.""
Perhaps one of his most brilliant characterizations arose during the
Court's ongoing debate over affirmative action laws. Justice Stevens
strongly disagreed with his colleagues' contention that all race-based
regulations should be reviewed under strict scrutiny, regardless of whether
the laws were designed to burden or benefit racial minorities. This
argument, he wrote in the 1995 case of Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena,
"disregard[s] the difference between a 'No Trespassing' sign and a welcome
mat." 2
EMPATHY
Few aspects of Justice Stevens's writing affected his readers (and
reflected his general approach as a jurist) more than his ability to use words
as a means to bring marginalized people into the Court's discussion.
Justice Stevens's ability to capture the point of view of racial minorities
was particularly noteworthy. For example, in the 2000 case of Illinois v.
Wardlow, 1" he dissented from the Court's ruling that the mere fact that
someone ran at the sight of a police officer provided reasonable suspicion
for the officer to stop the person. Justice Stevens sought to put his readers
in the shoes of those whose view of the police might differ from that of his
colleagues. "Among some citizens, particularly minorities and those
residing in high crime areas," he wrote, "there is also the possibility that the
fleeing person is entirely innocent, but, with or without justification,
''31believes that contact with the police can itself be dangerous.
In the 2007 case of Parents Involved v. Seattle Schools, the Court's
majority concluded that it was unconstitutional for two public school
districts to take race into account as a factor in deciding which school to
assign students to attend in an effort to avoid re-segregation of their
classrooms. 2 Justice Stevens responded:
There is a cruel irony in The Chief Justice's reliance on our decision
in Brown v. Board ofEducation. The first sentence in the concluding
paragraph of his opinion states: "Before Brown, schoolchildren were
28. EOC v. Wyoming. 460 U.S. 226.250 (1983) (Stevens, J.., concuring).
29. 515 U.S. 200, 245 (1995) (Stevens, J.. dissenting.).
30. 528 U.S. 19, 126 (2000) (Stevens, J.. concurring in part and dissenting in part).
31. Id. at 132.
32. Parents Involved in Omty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1, 551 U.S. 701, 709-11 (20(7).
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told where they could and could not go to school based on the color
of their skin." This sentence reminds me of Anatole France's
observation: "[T]he majestic equality of the la[w], . . . forbid[s] rich
and poor alike to sleep under the bridges, to beg in the streets, and to
steal their bread." The Chief Justice fails to note that it was only black
schoolchildren who were so ordered; indeed, the history books do not
tell stories of white children struggling to attend black schools. In this
and other ways, The Chief Justice rewrites the history of one of this
Court's most important decisions."
He even took a final jab at Chief Justice Roberts' opinion in his citation to
this paragraph adding: "Compare ante, at 746 ('history will be heard'),
with Brewer v. Quarternan (Roberts, C. J., dissenting) ('It is a familiar
adage that history is written by the victors.')."34
When it came to including women in judicial opinions, his approach was
often as simple as a carefully selected pronoun. In the Young v. American
Mini Theatres, Inc. case discussed earlier, for example, Justice Stevens-in
1976, mind you-referred to marching "our sons and daughters off to
war." Indeed, in a Justice Stevens opinion, you are likely to find the sole
use of female pronouns when generically describing judges,3 0 lawyers,37
voters, 8 and corporate chief executives.
Justice Stevens's ability to give voice to groups that are often overlooked
was not confined to race or gender. He also spoke up for criminal defendants
("No matter how culpable petitioner Dennison may be, the difference
between 11 1/2 months and 5 years of incarceration merits a more principled
justification than the luck of the draw."40 ); children ("It does not require a
33. Id. at 798-99 (Stevens, J., dissenting) (citations omitted).
34. Id. at 799 (citation om itted).
35. 427 U.S. 50, 70 (1976) (emphasis added).
36. See, e.g., Rita v. United States, 551 U.S. 338, 365 (2007) (Stevens, J., concurring) ("After all,
a district judge who gives harsh sentences to Yankees fans and lenient sentences to Red Sox fans would
not be acting reasonably even if her procedural rulings were impeccable.").
37. See, e.g., Ilarbison v. Bell, 556 U.S. 180, 188-89 (2009) ("It would require a federal lawyer
who obtained relief for her client in § 2254 proceedings to continue to represent him during his state
retrial."); Montcjo v. Louisiana, 556 U.S. 778, 806 n.2 (2009) (Stevens, J., dissenting) ("A lawyer can
provide her client with advice regarding the legal and practical options available to him.").
38. See, e.g., Crawford v. Marion Cnty. Election 3d., 553 U.S. 181, 186 (2008) ("A voter who has
photo identification but is unable to present that identification on election day may file a provisional
ballot that will be counted if she brings her photo identification to the circuit court clerk's office within
10 days.").
39. See, e.g., Am. Needle, Inc. v. Nat'l Football League, 560 U.S. 183, 189 (2010) (suggesting a
statute could apply to "a single 1irm's chief executive telling her subordinate how to price their company's
product.").
40. McMillan v. Pennsylvania. 477 U1.S. 79, 104 (1986) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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constitutional scholar to conclude that a nude search of a I3-year-old child
is an invasion of constitutional rights of some magnitude." 4 1); accident
victims ("It defies belief-and ascribes to the Members of Congress a
perverse, even barbaric, intent-to think that they spent days debating the
measure of extraconstitutional compensation they would provide riparian
landowners but intended-without a single word of dissent-to condemn
the widows, orphans, and injured victims of negligent operation of flood
control projects to an irrational exclusion from the protection of the
subsequently enacted Tort Claims Act." 4 2); and prisoners ("Measured by the
conditions that prevail in a free society, neither the possessions nor the slight
residuum of privacy that a prison inmate can retain in his cell, can have more
than the most minimal value. From the standpoint of the prisoner, however,
that trivial residuum may mark the difference between slavery and
humanity." 43 ).
Justice Stevens frequently warned against the dangers of classifying
groups of people-a practice, he said, that far too often persisted unchecked.
In the 1976 case of Mathews v. Lucas, involving a statute that burdened
some children simply because their parents were never married, he
explained: "Habit, rather than analysis, makes it seem acceptable and
natural to distinguish between male and female, alien and citizen, legitimate
and illegitimate; for too much of our history there was the same inertia in
distinguishing between black and white."44
He again cautioned of the threat of tradition as a means to perpetuate
discriminatory practices in the 2000 case of Bov Scouts v. Dale, involving
the group's expulsion of a gay scout leader. Dissenting from the Court's
decision in favor of the Scouts, Justice Stevens wrote that prejudices against
the LGBT community "have caused serious and tangible harm to countless
members of the class."4 5 This harm, he argued, "can only be aggravated by
the creation of a constitutional shield for a policy that is itself the product
of a habitual way of thinking about strangers."46 Prejudices end, he wrote,
through "interaction with real people, rather than mere adherence to
traditional ways of thinking." 47 He concluded his appeal for equality by
41. Safford Unified Sch. Dist. No. I v. Redding, 557 U.S. 364, 380 (2009) (Stevens, J., concurring)
(quoting Doe v. Renfrow, 631 F.2d 91, 92-93 (7th Cir. 1980)).
42. United States v. James, 478 U.S. 597, 620 (1986) (Stevens. J., dissenting).
43. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 542 (1984) (Stevens, J., concurring in part and dissenting in
part).
44. 427 U.S. 495, 520 (1976) (Stevens, J.. dissenting).
45. Boy Scouts of Am. v. Dale. 530 U.S. 640. 700 (2000) (Stevens. J., dissenting).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 699.
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powerfully declaring: "If we would guide by the light of reason, we must
let our minds be bold."1 4X
ELOQUENCE
In the end, however, it is likely not the humor nor the imagery nor the
empathy of Justice Stevens's writing that has the most long-lasting impact
on his readers. It is his eloquence. In cases where Justice Stevens felt
passionately about the issue, he found a way to convey that conviction
through words. And the topics that often engendered his most powerful
writing were the issues he holds most dear-patriotism and democracy.
One of Justice Stevens's most famous dissents comes from his 1989
opinion in Texas v. Johnson, which considered the constitutionality of laws
prohibiting the burning of the American flag. While the majority found that
such laws violated the First Amendment, Justice Stevens, a World War II
veteran and the only former member of the military serving on the Court at
the time, disagreed. The American flag, he wrote,
is more than a proud symbol of the courage, the determination, and
the gifts of nature that transformed 13 fledgling Colonies into a world
power. It is a symbol of freedom, of equal opportunity, of religious
tolerance, and of goodwill for other peoples who share our
aspirations. The symbol carries its message to dissidents both at home
and abroad who may have no interest at all in our national unity or
survival.4 9
He then concluded his dissent with these words:
The ideas of liberty and equality have been an irresistible force in
motivating leaders like Patrick Henry, Susan B. Anthony, and
Abraham Lincoln, schoolteachers like Nathan Hale and Booker T.
Washington, the Philippine Scouts who fought at Bataan, and the
soldiers who scaled the bluff at Omaha Beach. If those ideas are
worth fighting for-and our history demonstrates that they are-it
cannot be true that the flag that uniquely symbolizes their power is
not itself worthy of protection from unnecessary desecration."o
Whether his readers agreed or disagreed with his vote in that case, it is hard
not to be moved by his description of what the American flag meant to him.
48. Id. at 700.
49. Texas v. Johnson, 491 U.S. 397, 437 (1989) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
50. Id. at 439.
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More recently, Justice Stevens passionate disagreement with the
majority was on display in the 2010 campaign finance case of Citizens
United v. Federal Election Commission. He disputed the Court's assertion
that corporations have First Amendment rights to independently spend
unlimited amounts of money in political campaigns. This rule, he stated,
would disturb the most basic process of our elections. "A democracy," he
explained, "cannot function effectively when its constituent members
believe laws are being bought and sold."' In the final lines of his opinion,
he returned again to the subject of American democracy and wrote:
At bottom, the court's opinion is thus a rejection of the common sense
of the American people, who have recognized a need to prevent
corporations from undermining self-government since the founding,
and who have fought against the distinctive corrupting potential of
corporate electioneering since the days of Theodore Roosevelt. It is
a strange time to repudiate that common sense. While American
democracy is imperfect, few outside the majority of this court would
have thought its flaws included a dearth of corporate money in
politics.52
Sometimes Justice Stevens's eloquence arose from the simplicity of his
words such as his often quoted statement that "ft]here is only one Equal
Protection Clause."5 Other times it appeared in a reference to a famous
metaphor like his warning that "[w]henever we remove a brick from the
wall that was designed to separate religion and government, we increase the
risk of religious strife and weaken the foundation of our democracy."54 In
the Parents Involved case discussed earlier, he adopted a nostalgic tenor to
express his deep concerns with the damage he felt the majority was doing
to the legacy of Brown v. Board of Education. He wrote: "It is my firm
conviction that no Member of the Court that I joined in 1975 would have
agreed with today's decision." 5
If, however, there is one piece of Justice Stevens's writing that will be
long remembered for its eloquence, it is likely his dissent in Bush v. Gore.5 6
This was the case, of course, in which the Supreme Court, by a five-to-four
51. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 558 U.S. 310, 453 (2010) (Stevens, l., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
52. Id. at 479.
53. Craig v. Boren, 429 U.S. 190. 211 (1976) (Stevens, J.. concurring).
54. Zelman v. Simmons- jars, 536 U.S. 639, 686 (2002) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
55. Parents Involved in (mty. Sch. v. Seattle Sch. Dist. No. 1. 551 I .S. 701, 803 (2007) (Stevens.
J., dissenting).
56. 531 U.S. 98, 123 (2000) (Stevens, J., dissenting).
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vote, essentially decided the 2000 presidential election by halting the ballot
recount that was occurring in Florida. The case brought to an end the five-
week-long episode that had engulfed the country with drama, anger, and
chaos. As the main dissenter to the Court's opinion, Justice Stevens issued
a stern indictment of the Court's ruling and, in particular, stressed how the
ruling would damage the integrity of the judicial system. He wrote:
The endorsement of that position by the majority of this Court can
only lend credence to the most cynical appraisal of the work ofjudges
throughout the land. It is confidence in the men and women who
administer the judicial system that is the true backbone of the rule of
law. 5
He then concluded the dissent by giving voice to the millions of Americans
who felt the Court had overstepped and, in doing so, injured our democratic
process. In a few short sentences he captured the complicated and disturbing
feelings of so many. He wrote:
Time will one day heal the wound to that confidence that will be
inflicted by today's decision. One thing, however, is certain.
Although we may never know with complete certainty the identity of
the winner of this year's Presidential election, the identity of the loser
is perfectly clear. It is the Nation's confidence in the judge as an
impartial guardian of the rule of law.
It is an impossible task to truly capture Justice Stevens's talent as a
writer. Nonetheless, it is a task that is surely worth undertaking. Without
question, one of the great gifts Justice Stevens has given to us is an
abundance of exceptional writing. His clear, concise, and colorful prose
made us chuckle or sob or seethe or even roll our eyes. But like any great
superhero, he used his powers for good. He employed his knack with words
in order to strengthen his arguments, to make complex legal issues
comprehensible, and to capture the core values at stake in each case.
And in return for all of this, I have just two words for him: thank you.
57. Id. at 128.
58. Id. at 128-29.
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